The Ethics of Behavioral Medications 2: The Appeal to Nature

Many people believe that if you live with an anxious or fearful dog, it�s best to try dietary supplements first, before starting down a medical route that could include prescriptions for behavioral medications.  As a result, there are literally hundreds of different calming supplements available for dogs, most of which claim somewhere in the attending marketing spiel that they contain natural ingredients.  The fact that they are natural is often taken as a reason to prefer these supplements to behavioral medications. In this article, I�m going to argue that we can�t formulate a strong argument for the claim that calming supplements are in any way better than behavioral medications because they are natural.  

This claim has a practical and a moral component; I�ll dispense with the former before moving on to the latter.  

Practical

The practical part of the idea that natural is better is the claim that natural supplements are safer, with fewer side effects than �unnatural� medicines.  Leaving aside the fact that there are a great many natural plants that will kill you, the comparative safety of calming supplements is largely an empirical issue.  At the present time, there are no studies on the long-term side effects of any of the most common calming supplements; in fact, there are only a few studies specifically looking at the efficacy of using these supplements in dogs at all.  Furthermore, supplements generally are subject to fewer safety standards; US federal law does not require dietary supplements to be proven safe by the FDA before they go on sale.  

There are, however, well-documented side-effect profiles for all drugs approved for veterinary use by the FDA.  A drug has to be proven safe and effective before it reaches the market.  This difference in the amount of data in itself can skew the argument - prescription drugs can appear to be more dangerous just because we can read about their side effects and can only obtain them from a professional. But this isn�t necessarily true; side effects have been measured with many different supplements, even though there is no law that they must be labelled.    

Prescription drugs can indeed have side-effects, and knowing what to look for is a huge plus.  They are known to contain an element of risk that we choose to take on if we choose to give them to our dogs.  However, there is also an element of risk with supplements, which is aggravated by not knowing as much about them.  In the third part of this series, I will talk about the related risks of choosing supplements instead of prescription medications in more detail.  

Moral

The second component to this claim is that, other things being equal, natural things are morally better than unnatural things - that the more humans interfere with an animal, or a process, or a system, the less �good� it will be.  

This isn�t to say that anyone who argues supplements are a better option than prescription medications must believe that all natural things are good and all unnatural things are bad - we could never classify this consistently, because things like fire, clothing, all petrol are unnatural for humans, but all undeniably useful.*  But the underlying belief is that generally, if something is natural it is better than an unnatural alternative. 

One problem with with is with how we can sort natural things from unnatural things. Behavioral medications can�t be easily sorted into natural and unnatural for two reasons.  The first is that both supplements and prescription drugs are designed to do basically the same thing. In order for any effect to take place, the blood-brain barrier must crossed by whatever chemical is contained in the pill. And, in all cases, the chemicals in the pill work on existing neural chemical pathways; the brain architecture that is responsible for producing and reabsorbing the chemicals that cause emotional responses like fear and joy. These are the same pathways, by the way, that dog trainers use to build a reinforcement history for any behavior - see my last article. So the natural and unnatural chemicals are working in the same area.   

To be more specific, everything marketed as a calming supplement is designed to work on serotonin and on the GABAergic systems.  Prozac is designed to stop the brain from reabsorbing serotonin that it creates, meaning that overall levels of available serotonin in the brain will go up.  Tryptophan, a common supplement, is metabolized into serotonin, meaning levels in the brain will go up. Alprazolam and Lactium (also called Zylkene) are both meant to work on the GABA receptors. My point here is, whatever you�re putting into your dog to calm him, prescription or supplement, is going to be doing one of only a few possible things.  The difference is whether it will be doing these things effectively and safely.  Therefore it is not easy to divide natural and unnatural medications along these lines.  

The second reason sorting of natural and unnatural calming medications doesn�t work is because all supplements are processed in some way.  We don�t find any of these pills growing in the wild. 

Two of these are supplements, two are prescription.

There�s no clear cut way to say that one pill is natural and another is unnatural just by looking at it, or even at the processes used to make it. We still discover a lot of �unnatural� drugs from natural sources, for example, cancer drugs, aspirin, statins, anti-malarials, and opiates - many are easier and cheaper to synthesize than derive directly thanks to modern techniques, but they all come from plants.  Are they natural, and, if they are, does this give them any extra moral goodness?  These difficulties make it very difficult to hold on to the idea that natural is better.

I would contend that the only thing that matters morally here is whether what we�re doing works, and is worth the risk.  When faced with a dog who is suffering, we ought to go straight to the science, because we don�t want to be faced with a long process of trial and error.   Often finding the right prescription behavioral medications involves trial and error too, so there is already the potential for the dog to have to wait a long time before feeling any respite.  

If we combine the practical claim that it is better to use something that we know works, and whose side-effects have been fully studied, with the moral claim that there�s no reason to believe that we can isolate the property of naturalness and justify why it is good, we have compelling reason to reject the appeal to nature here.  People wishing to hold on to the moral difference between natural and unnatural things are faced with a burden of proof; they need to justify what it is about natural things that make them better, and to explain a clear way to distinguish natural from unnatural.  

Besides which, dogs themselves are inherently unnatural. There�s an air of irony when people talk about natural being better for dogs, because we humans haven�t interfered as much with any other species on the planet.  What is natural about humans choosing to create a chihuahua and a Great Dane out of the common ancestor of the European gray wolf?  Human artifice has created every breed of dog, designed for human purposes.  If humans are agents of the unnatural, then, dogs are our finest creation.

*Unless you�re a nudist on a raw diet, of course.  But every rule has its exceptions!  

The Ethics of Behavioral Medication in Dogs 1: Are Medications a Kind of Force?

This post is part one of a series I�m calling �The Ethics of Behavioral Medication in Dogs�, in which I�ll look at some of the common arguments in favor of and against giving dogs medications for anxiety, phobia and aggression.  

In this post, I�ll be discussing a claim I�ve seen on a few different dog trainer forums, which is that administering behavioral medications* to a dog is a form of force.  This ties in with a post from a couple of weeks ago on Force Free Training.  

Ethically speaking, the argument is this:

1. Any use of force within dog training is wrong; only methods that are �force free� are morally acceptable;
2. To force a dog to do something means to offer him no choice but to perform the behavior we want, usually by drectly manipulating his body. 
3. Medications like Prozac to treat anxiety compel a dog to behave differently to how he would otherwise behave, without giving him the choice by altering brain chemistry. 
4. Therefore this kind of medical intervention is a form of force. 
5. Therefore, using drugs like Prozac as an aid to training is wrong.

I'm going to argue that this argument doesn't give us enough justification to believe that using behavioral medication is wrong, because it doesn't adequately justify the claim that Prozac is a form of force, even if we accept the definition of force from premise 2.  We can see the flaws in this argument through an analogy with the old adage, �a tired dog is a happy dog�.  I am taking it as read, of course, that exercising a dog is not morally questionable.

Spot

Let�s say Spot is too bouncy and excitable around new people.  We want Spot to learn to greet strangers politely, but Great Aunt Mabel is dropping by tomorrow and we haven�t got a solid �paws on the floor� yet.  So the morning of Aunt Mabel�s visit, we take Spot out for the Best Hike Ever - fetch up and down a hill, running off-leash, some fun obedience too, and we give him a big breakfast when we get home.  We�re hoping Spot will be so tired and full that when Mabel visits, he�ll lay off the bouncing a little bit.  If we tell him to go to his mat, he�ll go instead of barreling past us into poor Aunt Mabel�s face.  

The �tired dog is a happy dog� idea is that if we give a dog exercise he is more likely to experience positive emotions like relaxation, and more likely to perform the calm behaviors we want.  Exercise is not just for his benefit, then, it�s also for ours - we want to avoid the behaviors that come from excess energy and lack of exercise. 

The brain chemistry changes that come with exercise are not something the dog has control over.  When we take him for a run or feed him a tasty meal, he can�t choose whether to release endorphins.  Exercise and the brain changes it brings are non-optional in a loose sense of the term.

Jape

Let�s say Jape is nervous around strangers, especially men, but Uncle Herbert often calls for a visit.  Jape�s owners want him to go lie on his mat quietly so that nobody will bother him, but Jape is so anxious that he can�t sit still, and often ends up getting too close to Uncle Herbert and scaring himself, making the whole thing worse.  Jape�s owners take him to the vet, who prescribes Prozac and suggests ways to make Jape happier on his mat. Everyone is hoping Jape will feel less anxious next time Uncle Herbert visits, so he can go somewhere where he won�t be bothered, and relax.  

Jape�s owners give him a pill every morning.  Jape doesn�t choose whether to take the pill and can�t understand what is in it. Taking the pill is non-optional and its effects are also non-optional. 

Prozac is designed to make Jape less likely to experience negative emotions and more likely to perform behaviors we want.  Jape�s owners want him to be more focused and less likely to go over threshold so he can listen to them and go to his mat, which is in his best interests. 

Like exercise, Prozac is not just for the dog�s benefit, it�s for ours - it is much easier to train and live with a dog that isn�t scattered and anxious; we are better equipped to give the dog coping skills rather than constantly needing to manage and worry.

Conclusion

The analogy holds because Prozac and exercise are similar in three ways.  The aim in both cases is the dog�s welfare and our own.  The mechanism is internal and not something the dog can directly control, and the chemicals involved create antecedents for behaviors that would not be likely to happen under normal circumstances.

In Spot's case, the effect of exercise as a training aid is short term; the chemicals released by exercise don't last forever. For Jape, the intervention is longer term, because Prozac is intended to correct a chemical imbalance. Even here, however, the distinction isn't that clear cut; dogs that are deprived of regular exercise can become frustrated, over-excitable and difficult to handle. The extra burst of tiredness and relaxation Spot's owners aimed at is backgrounded by a longer term commitment to regular exercise. 

In both cases then, the change in brain chemicals an antecedent, which effects behavior.  Behavior then has consequences, which then form a part of the next antecedent situation.  With Prozac, or exercise, we are altering the internal antecedents of a behavior.  If there's no difference in the relevant practical parts of two situations, there's no difference in the morality of those situations.  

If there is a moral difference between deliberately creating a situation where a dog�s brain has high levels of the chemicals released by exercise, and deliberately creating a situation where a dog�s brain has near-normal levels of the chemicals that mitigate depression and anxiety, it is not to be found in whether one is an example of �force�.



*I'm using "Prozac" as a generic catch-all term for behavioral medication, for clarity's sake. 

We Ought To Do The Best We Can

Let's say that Smith is a lifeguard, and he's sitting at his post when he sees Jones drowning.  When he goes to try to save Jones, Smith realizes he's been tied to his chair.  What ought Smith do?

Well, because Smith is a lifeguard, we can agree that he ought to save Jones, because it's a lifeguard's job to save drowning people.  But because Smith is prevented from leaving his chair, then, it seems wrong to say that Smith ought to save Jones, because Smith can't save Jones.  It's only true that we ought (morally) to do something, if we practically *can* do that thing.  

What, then, ought Smith do?  There are a couple of options. Either Smith can try to escape from his bindings, or he can call for someone else to save Jones.  So, to generalize, either Smith can try to make the situation back into how it was when we both ought to and was able to save Jones, or, Smith can change the situation so Jones is saved even though Smith is prevented from doing it. 

Most people would agree that the second option is better, because there's more chance Jones would be saved.  Trying to make the situation into one where the ideal is possible is liable to result in a bad outcome.  Smith ought to know this, so Smith ought to call for help.  Sometimes, if we can't do what we ought to do, we ought to do something else - the next best thing.  

How can this be applied to dog training?  One way is in how we approach training solutions.  Often, especially in training an anxious dog, we're confronted with a set of circumstances that mean we can't do the number 1, most ideal thing.  Maybe the dog lives somewhere that it has to confront other people and dogs just to go out to potty or exercise, so we can't completely control the distance of triggers.  Maybe the neighbors have a loud, barking do, so we can't completely control the desensitization process.  

Does this mean we should give up on training dogs in less than ideal situations?  No. Should we wait until the dog is in an ideal situation, even if that means never training, or training so rarely that no positive effect can happen?  No. 

My point is, if we can't do the best thing, we can do the next best thing.  And, it's not a moral failing if we accept that what we would have done in ideal circumstances is not possible here.  What is a failing, is to assume that anyone who asks "what is the best thing I can do in these less-than-ideal circumstances" either doesn't understand dog training, doesn't understand their obligations, or is not creative enough to make the situation into one where the ideal action is possible.  

Doing, Allowing and No-Reward Markers

Frustration is an unwanted side effect of positive dog training.  Although we strive for errorless learning and errorless performance, we can�t always control the antecedents as well as we might like.  Rewarding a dog for the behavior we want has the consequence that if a dog expects a reward and that reward is withheld, some frustration might ensue.  

Recently there has been a lot of debate about the place of �no-reward markers� (NRMs) in dog training.  Some trainers have argued that an NRM is a useful piece of information for the dog and can prevent longer-term frustration, others claim that it is an aversive and therefore has no place in �purely positive� training. Some clicker trainers claim that there is no need for an NRM because not clicking for a behavior is sufficient for the dog to understand that he must try something else to get a reward.¹

For the purposes of this article, I am defining an NRM as a noise or gesture that signifies to the dog that no reward will be presented for a behavior, but that does not cause the dog extra pain or fright.  The dog has to learn the connection between the no-reward marker and not being rewarded in the same way as he learned the connection between the clicker and a reward.  So, rolling one�s eyes and making a noise like �oops!� count as no-reward markers; dropping one�s keys on the kitchen floor or kicking the dog in the ribs do not. 

It�s reasonable to assume that the presence of an NRM would eventually become mildly frustrating in itself - pair it enough times with the disappointment of not getting an expected reward.  So when we use an NRM, we�re causing the dog to become mildly frustrated  - this is a conditioned emotional response.

Not clicking doesn�t cause the dog to become frustrated by itself - the frustration comes from an expected reward being withheld.  This means that the frustration the dog feels isn�t tied to an event like an NRM but it does still happen; the dog realizes that no expected treat is coming at some point after he performs the behavior, and that�s frustrating for him.  The difference is, in this case the trainer hasn�t performed an action that frustrates the dog, the dog has become frustrated �on his own�.  

So is there a moral difference between causing frustration with an NRM, and allowing frustration to happen by withholding a click?  I will argue that, in this particular case, there is not. 

In ethics, there is an ongoing debate about whether it is morally worse to cause harm than it is to allow harm to happen.  The general consensus is that it is worse to do harm than to allow harm, and there are literally hundreds of examples that illustrate the distinction.²  

One justification for the claim that doing and allowing are morally different has to do with probability - by doing an action, we make it certain that the consequence of that action will occur.  By allowing the action, we only make it much more likely that the consequence will occur.  There might, for example, be a tiny chance of a recovery if we turn off a patient�s life support, but no chance at all if we perform euthanasia. 

In dog training, we could make the claim that using an NRM definitely will cause frustration, whereas not clicking only probably causes frustration.  Therefore, it could be argued, we should avoid using the NRM.  

This argument doesn�t work, however, because adding an NRM doesn�t make frustration more likely.  We could imagine that although many dogs get frustrated if they don�t get the reward they expect, some just don�t.  However, a dog that doesn�t get frustrated when he doesn�t get the reward he expects also wouldn�t be frustrated by an NRM.  If not getting an expected reward just isn�t frustrating, he�d never develop a conditioned emotional response to the eye rolling, or the word �oops!�.  It would just be information.  The likelihood of frustration depends on the dog, and on the trainer�s skill, not on the mere presence of an NRM. 

The factors that make the difference between examples of doing and allowing in ethics don�t exist in dog training - factors like whether the harm would have happened if we were not present, whether we intended to cause the harm and so on.  This is because when we are training a dog, we are putting him in a situation we have decided he should be in and we have created.  What we do, or don�t do, in that situation is always our responsibility.

The frustration the dog feels at not getting a reward is our responsibility whether we cause it with an NRM or allow it to happen by withholding a click.  This being the case, it is better to focus on the way training is set up and create conditions to minimize frustration rather than focus on how that frustration comes to happen.  

Whether a dog gets frustrated during training is down to a combination of the dog�s personality, the task at hand, and the trainer�s skill in setting him up for success, not merely whether an NRM is used. If both approaches can lead to frustration, there is no obvious ethical difference between using an NRM and withholding a click.  If there is a difference, it must be empirical - that one approach leads to more frustration; that the conditioned emotional response to the NRM is worse than the frustration of not getting a click.  

1  Materials like this article from the Karen Pryor Academy make this claim.

2  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an excellent introductory article to the Doing and Allowing distinction with a bibliography.

Humiliation in Dogs

What�s wrong with these pictures?  

If you reacted to these pictures with any kind of repulsion, chances are part of your explanation for your reaction would involve the idea of humiliation.  It�s humiliating to clip a Poodle so that it looks like a My Little Pony toy, or to dress a daschund in a wedding dress.  This raises the question; what does it mean to humiliate a dog, and why is it wrong?  

This question isn�t just reserved for idle judgement, increasingly it's a legal issue.  Since 1992, the Swiss Constitution  has made provision for the dignity of animals.  Part of respecting the dignity of animals, the drafters of the Constitution claim, is protecting them from �humiliation�.¹  In the UK, the Royal Society for the Protection of Animals has released a statement suggested that people who dress up their dogs could be prosecuted under some circumstances.²

In this post, I�ll discuss whether dogs really are being humiliated by being subject to extreme grooming and dressing up, and, if they�re not, how we can capture the intuition that there is something wrong. I�ll reconstruct both sides of the argument before concluding that doing these things to dogs is not humiliating, but there is still something wrong with it. 

Before we look at what it means to humiliate a dog, I�ll first explain what it means to humiliate a human being.  When one person humiliates another, she causes him to feel ashamed of himself; like he is less of a person.  Humiliation has a social component - it is done to one person by another, and part of feeling humiliated is feeling the �gaze� of others and feeling diminished in their eyes. Avishai Margalit defines a humiliating act as anything that gives the victim a sound reason to feel humiliated. What counts as a �sound reason� will depend on features of the individual - the sort of things he believes are humiliating given his culture and character; and features of the context.³

The most important part of humiliation is that we can�t be humiliated unless we believe we are being humiliated. This is because humiliating someone is designed to injure their self-respect, so the humiliator has to know enough about the victim to know whether the intended action will humiliate him. Being told to wear women�s clothing, for example, is humiliating to most men, but not all of them. 

On this conception of humiliation, it�s clear that dogs can�t be humiliated because they can�t believe they are being humiliated. They don�t have the kind of complex self-respect that humans do, the kind that link body image to a sense of personal identity.  I�m not saying that dogs don�t have a sense of self, just that if they do it is unlikely to relate to the way they look. With the example of �doggie marriage�, this is unlikely to be specifically humiliating because it is a sham marriage, since dogs can�t understand this concept.  To a dog, walking next to another dog in a silly costume and then doing a sit-stay whilst people say things is unlikely to register as impacting their self-respect.  

MOVING THE GOALPOSTS

So, it is unlikely that we can find an account of dog humiliation just by looking at what it means for humans to be humiliated in terms of their self-respect.  The concept needs to be altered if it is going to make any sense.  If humiliation can apply to dogs it must apply regardless of what the dog is thinking and feeling.  

Again, it might be possible to look at humans as an analogue.  In particular, those humans who don�t have the relevant ability for self-respect - comatose people, people with severe intellectual disabilities, people with late-stage dementia and so on.  If we can humiliate these people, then potentially we can humiliate dogs too.

This would be too quick, however, because the reason that certain actions are humiliating to adults who used to have self-respect, or who have the potential for self-respect, does not apply to dogs. We can think about what these people would have wanted, either before they got into their current condition or if they didn�t have their current condition.  Being left naked, for example, is humiliating to any adult because they would not have consented to it if they could.  This argument still relies on self-respect, so it cannot apply to dogs.  

MOVING THE GOALPOSTS AGAIN

Now that I�ve dismissed two conceptions of humiliation, I�m left with one final description that might apply to dogs.  This is that, by interfering excessively in a dog�s appearance by dressing it up or grooming it outlandishly, an owner is treating her dog like a doll, not like a dog.  Dogs are entitled to a special kind of respect because of the kind of thing they are - a living, sentient creature. Treating them like an object is wrong because it means treating the dog as if they do not have the features that make them worthy of this kind of respect. 

Literally, the word �humiliate� comes from the Latin �humus�, dirt.  Humiliating someone sets them below you, it grinds them into the dirt as you stand over them.  The overall effect is a lowering of status. So treating a dog like a doll is humiliating because it means lowering their status.  This would hold even if the dog can�t understand. 

Even this conception of humiliation does not quite work, because it relies on an indefensibly strong claim that dressing a dog up, or grooming him excessively, is automatically objectifying because it means treating the dog as something less than he is.  If this were true, we would be humiliating babies by dressing them up in little dinosaur costumes, because this would mean we�re seeing babies as entitled to the same respect as dinosaurs, or dolls.  Babies can�t understand clothes, so we can dress them however we like, and many parents enjoy putting their little ones in crazy costumes...

Concern about humiliating babies seems like a futile constraint on parental creativity; what matters is the baby is happy and able to explore and learn about the world in a loving, safe environment.  The same can be said about dogs - it is wrong to treat a dog just like a doll, but if it is possible to dress them up and groom them into weird shapes whilst also paying attention to their welfare, then the dog is not being treated just like a doll and therefore not being humiliated.  To paraphrase Kant, we are not treating the dog merely as a means to an end just by dressing him up, by paying attention to his welfare we are at the same time treating him as an end in himself. 

I would contend that the reaction people have to extreme grooming and dog clothing stems from the perception that the dog is being treated like something less than a dog. Part of this is a worry that the dog is being objectified, which I have dealt with here.  But another part comes from a picture of the ideal, or natural dog - a Lassie, or a Rin Tin Tin.  Deviation from this archetype strikes many people as necessarily a diminishment of what�s essential and good about dogs, and as we�ve seen, the concept of humiliation well captures what it means to diminish someone.  This suggests a �normative essentialist� conception of what a good dog is - an important theme I will return to in a later post.  Suffice to say, for the moment, that just because something is natural, or �the way it always has been�, doesn�t make it good now.  

If there is anything prima facie wrong with dressing dogs up or grooming them to extremes, it is that there is always the potential to overlook the dog�s welfare in the owner's pursuit of her own desires. But this is as true for dog shows, sports, jobs like search and rescue and everyday experiences with dogs as it is for dressing them up or extreme grooming.  Any time a dog is being used, there is always the possibility that it is being used merely as a means to an end, and there's no reason to restrict our worries to the more bizarre examples of the dog-human partnership.  This reminds us that we have a duty to pay attention to what our dog partners are telling us, whether it�s at the dog park or at their wedding.

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1. "The Dignity of Animals" (2001) Joint Statement by the Swiss Ethics Committee on Non-Human Gene Technology and the Swiss Committee on Animal Experiments. Available at http://www.cnz.uzh.ch/BurkiDignity-Animals-2001.pdf
2. "RSPCA says people who dress up their dogs could be prosecuted" The Telegraph, Jan 13 2009. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4227567/RSPCA-says-people-who-dress-up-their-dogs-could-be-prosecuted.html.
3. Margalit, A. (1996)  "The Decent Society" . Harvard University Press. 

The Role of Ethics in Discussions of Dog Training

This blog post was widely shared in the dog training community a couple of weeks ago:

http://www.yourpitbullandyou.com/what-is-the-proper-way-to-hurt-a-dog/

The post was well-written and it raised some great points, but one phrase stood out to me: �my ethics are mine and yours are yours�.  I immediately took issues with this because it appeared to be equating �ethics� with �moral relativism�; as if my ethical beliefs are like my opinions - something I am entitled to whether or not they make any sense.  

Ethical beliefs are not like opinions, they�re not vague statements of �stuff I feel� that nobody has the right to question.  Ethics is a discipline that follows logical rules and, theoretically at least, generates principles that are justifiable to any rational person. There might be disagreement over premises, but this doesn't mean there's no possibility of debate.

In fact, I strongly believe that talking about ethics is important in dog training just because it forces people to confront their own beliefs in a rational way, rather than walling them off behind "well I'm entitled to my beliefs and it's all subjective anyway".  The principles that inform dog training, like the desire to create strong, healthy relationships between dogs and their owners, are too important to be waved away as mere subjectivity.  

Most people become dog trainers because they care about the welfare of dogs.  They therefore have ethical principles about how we ought to care for dogs; giving them the skills they need to live in a human world through training is part of animal welfare. I would contend that almost all dog owners and professionals who work with dogs share the principle that causing a dog unnecessary suffering is wrong, and we have a duty to prevent it. 

But caring alone isn�t a guarantee of morally right action.  Being ill-informed about what dogs are and how they learn can lead to a course of action that is, strictly speaking, ethical insofar as the trainer is trying to do the right thing, but it�s still wrong because the facts it draws on are mistaken.  Not understanding the ways a dog shows us that he is suffering, for example, can lead to misinterpreting being shut down through chronic fear for �calm submission�.  It�s not enough to believe that unnecessary suffering is wrong if you can�t recognize it when you see it.  An ethical dog trainer understands dogs and brings this knowledge to bear when choosing a course of action.  

We can criticize arguments about whether an approach or a tool is morally right without insulting anyone or resorting to something like �if you do this you�re a monster� - a sentiment I�ve run across too many times in discussions with trainers. Discussing ethical principles should not be taken as an instant ad hominem attack.  By paying attention to what the underlying ethical principles in an argument are, the conception of what a dog is that informs those principles, and the logic behind the argument we can judge whether a trainer is making the right decision in the tools he chooses to use.

What Is �Force-Free� Training? A Conceptual Analysis

There are a lot of explanations of force-free training on reinforcement-based training sites.  Clicker training, for example, is claimed to be �force free� because it theoretically does not use aversives in any form, only positive reinforcement.  However, some aversive-based trainers also describe themselves as �force free�, because they do not physically touch the dog during the training process, only using remote corrections. There is some conceptual confusion over the meaning of the word �force� in dog training. 

In this article, I am going to make the argument that �force-free� does not capture what the shock collar trainer or the clicker trainer wants it to capture. 

First, I will give an example of what force-free training does mean, then show that it is inadequate.  Pushing on a dog�s behind to get him to sit, standing on his leash to get him to lie down, or pinching his ear until he drops a toy are all examples of force in dog training. On this definition, �force-free� training is any technique that refrains from physically manipulating a dog�s body, including the use of shock collars, bark discs and other remote aversives.  This is correct to a point, but it does not do the work that reinforcement-based trainers are using it to do, which is to distinguish reinforcement-based training from aversive-based training.

At this point I�ve talked about what force-free doesn�t mean.  Which leaves is with the question, what does it mean to force someone to do something?  We have to move beyond this basic definition of force and look to a more subtle understanding of the concept. 

An analogy with humans is informative at this point.  When someone says, �I was forced to do it�, they mean �I had no choice�.  But what they really mean is, �I felt like I had no choice�.  As Immanuel Kant put it in his characteristically Puritan way, 

Suppose that some one were to aver of his most passionate desire that it were irresistible if the alluring object and the opportunity to it were at hand; ask him whether he might not be able to master this desire if a gallows were erected before the house where he is to avail himself of this opportunity, in order that he might be hanged thereupon immediately after his savored passion . . . it won't take long to guess his answer.

We judge whether a person �really� has no choice by looking at what the potential consequences of his actions were and whether it would be reasonable to expect him to resist.  In Kant�s example, avoiding death is more important than seeing one�s mistress, to the point where no rational person would choose death.  Kant�s example is one where most people would claim they were �forced� to give up their mistress on pain of death.

A positive example is, for example, if I offered you a thousand dollars for the last candy in your bag.  You might have been looking forward to it, but really, you�d be crazy to refuse.  Although we don�t typically talk in terms of being �forced� to part with the candy, the mechanics are the same - in both cases we are being made an offer we can�t rationally refuse.  

Anyway, the point here is that on this definition, me �forcing� you to do something means making all options other than the one I want you to do seem like they are not really options at all.  This can be by making the other options so terrible that only one seems possible, or making this option so good that the others seem terrible by comparison.  

In dog training, we call this �setting the dog up for success�.  Why?  Because behavior is lawful. Dogs perform the behavior that they believe, at the time, will lead to the best consequences for them. Either they�re most likely to get food, or a toy, or praise or, they�re most likely to avoid a shock or a startle or a verbal correction.  We manipulate the antecedents and the consequences to make the behavior we want the one we get. 

When we give a dog positive reinforcement for sitting, we�re creating a history of positive associations between the command �sit� and sitting.  Create a strong enough history, the theory goes, and the dog will sit even in the presence of a distracting squirrel, because to them, sitting on command is like taking a thousand dollars for a piece of candy. 

When we give a dog positive aversive for breaking a sit before he�s told, we�re creating a history of negative associations between the cue �sit� and any action other than sitting. For them, even if there�s a squirrel, maintaining the sit seems irresistible, even if there�s nothing physically stopping him.  If the shock is aversive enough, the squirrel is like the mistress in Kant�s example - pleasurable, but not worth it.  In both cases, reliability of the behavior is dependent on creating the conditions where a dog would not rationally choose to do anything else. 

In human terms, if the examples I gave above are convincing, we would call this �forcing� because it would undermine a human�s sense of responsibility for her actions.  In dogs, it�s called �training�; making the choice we want the only one the dog would choose no matter what the situation.*

So once again �force� doesn�t really cut across reinforcement and aversive - the difference between these two is not in what�s happening in terms of creating choice-conditions for the dog.  In both cases we�re funneling the dog�s desires into the behaviors we want him to perform; because behavior is lawful, he effectively doesn�t have a choice.  

Other than the initial distinction between use of physical manipulation, the concept of �force free� training does not do the work that dog trainers use it for.  It cannot distinguish between reinforcement-based and aversive-based methods.  This is one reason why the phrase has been a source of contention in the dog training world. 

Is the concept of �force free� training worth anything, then?  I would argue that it is, for two reasons.  One is to make that initial distinction between physical force and shaping choices remotely, which is useful in some circumstances.  Secondly, much more importantly is that, for dogs, the illusion of choice is important for their wellbeing.  Arguably, the same is true of humans (although I�m not touching the free will debate with a bargepole!).  �Force free� makes us confront the fact that in shaping behaviors we are making certain actions irresistible for dogs, whether as part of a training program or accidentally, and the fact that dogs are so easily shaped and manipulated in this way gives us a certain responsibility to them.  

Even if we�re in the background doing the funneling, dogs want to feel like they�re a partner in their training, and they should be allowed to express their creativity where possible and not be controlled at all hours of the day.  We shouldn�t see dogs as robots that we strive to master the programming of - �force free� training to my mind is letting the dog decide what it wants without always telling it first.  It�s trying to accommodate a wide variety of reinforcers and developing a relationship so that both learner and teacher work out the best way to build a bond. Too much control over behavior can lead to compulsion, not obedience.  

*Of course, this isn�t always possible - a dog that reliably sits and stays in the presence of other dogs may not do so in the presence of a running chicken, even though he knows you have a pocket full of hot dogs.  A dog that reliably avoids the shock from an invisible fence might choose to run right through it if the neighbor passes by with a cat on a harness.

Double Effect and "Purely Positive" Training

Some people argue that there is no such thing as �purely positive� training, because even 100% R+ trainers �use� aversives.  This makes them no better than P+ trainers because in both cases, the dog is suffering during training.  They give examples of dogs �in drive� and so desperate for a reward that withholding it is aversive.  A dog with an incredibly high prey drive and low self-control, for example, might shake, cry, and show classic signs of stress and frustration when deprived of the chance to chase a toy.  If chasing a toy is the reward in an R+ training session, then the dog is not rewarded for non-performance of a desired behavior, so for these kinds of dogs are arguably going to suffer during such a session.  

There are a few things wrong with the practicalities of this scenario, but let�s go with it as a way to test whether the conclusion - that the R+ trainer�s use of aversives makes them �no better� than a P+ trainer - is justifiable.  Although there have already been some excellent discussions of this issue, I want to show how academic ethics can give dog trainers a different set of resources to make the argument. 

Trolleys and Bridges

The Doctrine of Double Effect is a popular idea in academic ethics.  It states that it is permissible to allow harm to happen if it is an unavoidable side-effect of a good action.  The classic example goes something like this:

You are standing by a train track, next to a lever that switches the points from the track on the left to the track on the right.  You notice that a train is coming, and that there are five workmen on the right track, but also one workman on the left track.  Do you switch the points?

Philippa Foot argues that it is permissible to switch the points, because five people dying is worse than one, and - crucially - you�re not killing one person in order to save five people (Foot 1967).  Judith Jarvis Thompson contrasts Foot�s example with this one:

You are standing on a bridge, next to a very overweight man.  You notice that a train is coming, and that there are five workmen on the track in front of you.  There is no way to warn them, but you know that pushing the overweight man onto the track will stop the train and save the workmen.  Do you push the man?

Thompson argues that it is not permissible to kill a man deliberately in order to save others; it isn�t right to use someone�s body like this.  The difference is in whether the death (a moral wrong) is an intentional, or integral part of the action.  In the Trolley Problem, the deaths of the one workman wouldn�t change the fact that five workmen would be saved by switching the points.  In the Bridge Problem, the death of the overweight man is an integral part of saving the five workmen.  Double effect states that it is permissible to do an action with harm as an unintended consequence, but not to do harm as an intentional and integral part of an action.  So, it is okay to flip the switch in the Trolley Problem, but not to push the man in the Bridge Problem. 

How This Applies to R+

The mechanism of operant conditioning that underlies R+ training works whether the dog becomes distressed when the reward is withheld or not.  Something positive being added to a dog who is already happy will work as a reinforcer.  The circuit doesn�t depend on there being any stress or frustration; if it happens that the dog does suffer from a bad lack of self control that causes him to get upset at the absence of a reward, this is something the R+ trainer should try to minimize.  Note that I'm not suggesting that all frustration should be completely avoided; some is unavoidable, especially when we're working with high drive dogs doing the thing they love.  Frustration, if kept to a minimal level, can actually provide additional motivation (Amsel and Roussel, 1952) and removing it entirely from the picture, whilst ethically desirable, is often practically unworkable.

The critic of the R+ trainer is assuming that the R+ trainer�s methods work like the Bridge Problem, where the death of the overweight man is an intended part of saving the five workmen.  If the stress was needed for the training to work, then this would be true.  But in fact, the R+ trainer�s methods work like the Trolley Problem, where the death of the one workman is neither intended or necessary for saving the five.  The R+ trainer�s ideal situation would be a dog who didn�t feel stressed at the prospect of his reinforcement being withheld, since the stress isn�t necessary or intentional.  

So, there is a moral difference between training methods that intentionally use aversives, and methods that have stress or frustration as an unintended, unnecessary side-effect.  It�s not true to say that there is no such thing as a purely positive training method, even though it might be true that some real-life training situations are less than purely positive. This is something R+ trainers should be working to avoid.  

References and Notes

• Foot, Philippa (1967). "The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect". In B. Steinbock and A. Norcross (eds), Killing and Letting Die. NY: Fordham University Press. 
• Thompson, Judith Jarvis (1976) "Killing, letting die and the trolley problem". The Monist 59, pp 204-17.
• Amsel, A and Roussel, J (1952) "Motivational properties of frustration: effect on a running response of the addition of frustration to the motivational complex". Journal of Experimental Psychology 43(5), pp. 363-368
• General notes on drive and frustration in dogs: http://www.training-your-dog-and-you.com/drive.html
• Another way to approach the fallacy of "purely positive training": http://eileenanddogs.com/2013/07/08/purely-positive-all-positive/

A

"Results Based Training" - Does the End Justify the Means?

The Question:

I sometimes hear it as a rebuttal against trainers who represent themselves as purely positive, or as adherents to a particular theory. 

�I�m not a positive dog trainer, I�m a results-based trainer.  I do what works.� 

What does this mean?  

Means and Ends

One way to see the results-based trainer is as making use of the old adage, �the ends justify the means�.  At first glance, this looks like a way to bypass ethics in favor of pure pragmatism, as if it could be rephrased as �Never mind what�s right or wrong, what matters is that I achieve my aim in training�. Seeing the results-based trainer that way would be unfair, however, it would characterize her as amoral or concerned with suffering. 

Even Machiavelli, to whom the phrase is most commonly attributed, claimed that if cruel acts were ever necessary to preserve a State, they ought to be as swift and minimal as possible, meaning that he was committed to the idea that these acts did need some external justification.  So, the principle of charity dictates that we can't see the results-based trainer as trying to sidestep the demands of morality by appealing to pragmatism.  Instead, we have to understand her as making a specific claim about morality.  

Purely in terms of ethical theory, �the end justifies the means� can refer to consequentialism, the theory that what happens as the result of an action, rather than its motive, determines whether an action can be called good.  Practically, �the ends justifies the means� can refer to the claim that it is permissible to do something a little bad, in order to achieve a much greater good.  This is the most pertinent application for dog trainers.  In particular, it informs the rationale of many P+ trainers.

Or - and here we return to the theoretical understanding of the phrase -  it can mean that the use of an aversive like a shock collar cannot be classed as harm because it is necessary to achieve the goal. Something harmful is only morally wrong when it�s true that we shouldn�t do it.*  This is the most problematic interpretation, but there is some precedent.  We don�t see the vet as harming our dogs when she operates on them, even though she is causing pain.  The operation is for the dog�s greater good, and this takes away the moral badness of the pain.  Of course, we expect the vet to do everything she can to minimize any pain - unnecessary suffering is a morally wrong harm, but necessary suffering is not.  If the pain of using an aversive is both unavoidable and in the dog�s best interest, then the pain cannot be classed as a morally wrong harm.  

The results-based trainer could be seen as claiming that causing pain to a dog is permissible only so long as it successfully teaches the dog to do what the trainer wants, because what matters in training is results first. This runs into the requirement to justify the necessity of the use of aversives.  

The Burden of Proof

Assuming that an R+ and a P+ method are equally effective, there is a burden of proof on the P+ trainer to demonstrate that the harm is a necessary element of the training.  She must show that there is no way to avoid a small amount of harm if we are to achieve the end we are seeking.  Like the vet, the P+ trainer must show that whilst she is doing everything she can to minimize suffering, some aversion is necessary. 

No such immediate burden of proof rests on the R+ trainer, because positive methods are not harmful in themselves.  Assuming equal efficacy, there is no demand to justify the use of R+ rather than P+ methods.  This is the kind of reasoning the LIMA scale makes use of; if we�re not using the least invasive, minimally aversive method for training, we need to give a reason why.  

It�s not enough to claim �I just do whatever gets results�, because in most cases the same results can be obtained through a variety of training approaches.  We therefore have to ask, what does the results-based trainer class as the best result, and is this compatible with what�s best for the dog? 

____________________________________________________________________

*This is why an earthquake is harmful but not a moral wrong - morality only applies to the actions of people. It is also why surgical procedures are painful but not wrong - it would be wrong for a surgeon not to operate to save a patient�s life because it would hurt them. So when we say an action is wrong, we are saying that it should not be done.

Proving the Rules

If I were to punch triple heavyweight champion boxer Wladimir Klitschko in the face, several things could happen.  I could end up on the floor.  I would almost certainly break my fingers.  I may end up spending a night in jail.  Lots of potential outcomes, but one thing is nearly certain: I wouldn�t hurt him.  

Does my inability to injure Klitschko mean that the claim �punching people in the face hurts� is untrue?  Logically, yes.  But not practically.  The rule �face-punching = pain� is still a good enough guide that we would rely on it to guide our actions.  We can still say with enough certainty, �since I don�t want to hurt this person, I should refrain from punching him in the face.�  Klichko�s iron jaw is a corner case, an exception that �proves� the rule, it�s not a reason to reject the rule outright.  

Getting on to dog training, I�ve sometimes seen it claimed that because pain is subjective and one dog will feel something as painful when another won�t, we should dismiss phrases like �shock collars are painful�.  I can easily believe that a Klitschkoesque mastiff would experience the same force applied from a shock collar differently from a antelope-necked Italian Greyhound, but the individual corner cases once again don�t obviate the usefulness of the rule in general.  Shock collars might not hurt every dog at every level, but shock collars still hurt.  When we decide whether training a dog using shock is okay, we can still take "shock collars = pain" as useful data in most cases. 

Why might there be resistance to the idea that we can talk about variation at the level of individual dogs whilst still maintaining the integrity of general rules at the more abstract level?  One reason is the way that some of these rules have become entrenched to the point where even one deviation is considered heretical. 

To give a non-P+ example, every so often someone reports their frustrations when R+ training a dog who is not food motivated at all.  A dog who just doesn�t want to work for treats, or even toys.  Online at least, reports of these dogs sometimes come up against R+ trainers who simply refuse to believe in their existence, claiming that �dogs are food motivated� must mean that every dog, everywhere, forever must be interested in working for treats.  They�re wedded to the rule to the point that any exception creates cognitive dissonance, which gives rise to creative attempts to avoid accepting the account, often phrased as �you don�t have high enough value treats� or, �your timing must be wrong�.  

The answer to escaping from this nest of dissonance and dogma is practically simple, but unfortunately nearly impossible to implement in the environments in which these rules are discussed.  It�s just to know the dog in front of you; his physiology, temperament, what interests him and what he doesn�t like.  Remembering that the individual level of interaction and the abstract level of theory demand different types of observation and reasoning ultimately strengthens the theory that grounds the rules, by giving theorists the chance to introduce some flexibility and exceptions to their techniques whilst retaining their fundamental insights.

Call Your Dog!: Recognizing the right to make demands

In an earlier post, I mentioned Stephen Darwall�s definition of respect and how it�s related to recognizing other people as a legitimate source of authority.  One area that this kind of respect for authority is lacking is at the dog park (or anywhere dogs are allowed to meet each other at close range). There are lots of good reasons why you ought to call your dog if someone asks you to:

• Because the other dog might be dangerous;
• Because the other dog might be contagious;
• Because your dog might inadvertently scare the other dog;
• Because your dog might not behave like you expect him to;
• Because I told you to.  

Of all of these, only the last one really matters. You might not always understand why someone is asking you to call your dog, but you ought to do it anyway.  

Last week, I was walking my dog in a park, in an area where many people let their dogs run free.  A lady with a stately Golden Retriever, off-leash, wandered into our range.  I noticed that the dog was getting quite close to my reactive dog Edie, who was on a long line. I called over, �Hey, could you call your dog?�.  The lady replied, �Oh, my dog doesn�t care about little dogs like that�, and she did not call her dog.  I said, �Well, mine�s in training and can be aggressive, so could you call your dog?�, but again the lady just smiled and repeated herself. 

Then, of course, the elderly Golden did notice Edie and began to wander towards her (there�s always a first time, right?).  Thankfully, we were able to exit the scene before Edie started to panic, so no harm was done, but this interaction is typical of the failure to recognize other humans as a legitimate source of demands when it comes to dogs. 

It shouldn�t have mattered whether the lady believed her dog wouldn�t �bother� my dog, she should have recognized that I was within my rights to demand that she call her dog.  The reason for this is that she should have realized that I was a morally legitimate source of demands in this situation.  

The legitimacy of moral demands is not conditional on the other person agreeing with or even understanding them, they rest on the recognition that the person doing the demanding has the authority to make such demands. Darwall uses the example of someone standing on your foot on the train.  You ask him to get off your foot, not whether he thinks it�s a good idea to be standing there.  That doesn�t matter.  You don�t explain that he�s hurting you, or that you need to move your foot to get off the train.  That doesn�t matter either.  What matters is that we all have a personal space that we can demand others not interfere with, without needing to supply an external reason.  Our bodies, possessions and the dependents in our families - including our dogs - are all within this space.

Moral authority is mutual; I recgonize you as a person who can make certain demands, and you recognize the same authority in me.  Darwall calls this �the second-person standpoint�; the understanding that you and I are equally able to claim our rights from each other.  Therefore, I shouldn�t refuse demands from you that I would resent you refusing from myself.

When I ask you to call your dog, I�m asking you to recognize me as able to make the demand that you respect my sphere of authority, to enter into a mutual relationship based on reciprocal respect.  Refusing to do so doesn�t just put our dogs in danger, it�s disrespectful on a more fundamental level.  So please, call your dog.   Even if you think I�m overreacting.  

Exploring the problem with �cookie training�

�Cookie Trainer� is a derogatory term referring to people who train their dog purely using positive reinforcement.  This means, when your dog does something right (or stops doing something wrong), you give him a treat to show him that he�s done something you want him to do again.  In this post, I�m going to charitably reconstruct the point of view of a trainer who doesn�t use positive reinforcement, to try to understand why there is such derision of it as a method.  

My reconstruction is an aggregate of various online encounters I�ve had with trainers that don�t use treats, to avoid naming names.

P+ Trainer: 

�Well, I�m sure that for a lot of behaviors you can get a dog to do what you want with treats, but as soon as he knows you don�t have any treats, why would he bother doing what you want?  He�s only good for as long as you�ve got the cookies, not because of anything else.  My dog does what he�s told because he respects me, your dog just sees you as a Pez dispenser.�

As this is a charitable reconstruction, I�m not going to take issue with the truth of this statement right off the bat.  Instead, I�m going to see whether there is any kind of insight behind it that we might learn from.  

The Charitable Reconstruction

When it�s put in terms of the difference between a dog obeying out of desire for treats, and out of respect for his handler, we can see that there could be something valuable in the P+ trainer�s way of thinking.  According to the P+ trainer, the R+ trainer reduces her relationship with her dog to a purely transactional one.  The dog gets paid for working for the trainer.  So long as the trainer has something the dog wants, the dog will obey because he knows that this is the best way to get it.  The motivation, then, is an external one; the dog is being mercenary in his obedience.  

The way that P+ trainer sees things, her dog is motivated to obey regardless of whether anything good will happen because her dog respects her.  The nature of this relationship is not transactional and not mediated by an external motivator like a treat, it is founded on feelings that the dog has about the trainer and nothing else.  

We do tend to see a relationship of respect as having more inherent value than a transactional relationship; it�s the ideal we strive for within our families and in the workplace.  We want people to work for us because of us, not because of some resource we control.  With dogs, who we see as ideally loyal, obedient animals that we enter into a relationship with when we train, it�s only natural to want the same kind of thing, and so to place little value on paying them off.  A mercenary is never as trustworthy as a retainer. 

So, if I�m right in my arguments, we can understand a little better what�s underlying the P+ trainer�s unwillingness to see R+ as equally valuable, because it speaks to a different kind of relationship between trainer and dog.  Now I will explain what�s wrong with seeing things this way.

Dogs don�t understand high-level concepts like respect

The most compelling argument against the P+ trainer�s view is that dogs simply don�t work in the way she is describing.  They�re not capable of processing abstract concepts like respect, guilt, shame or responsibility.  These are concepts that we often attribute to dogs, but that science has shown us are just anthropomorphism at work (Horowitz 2009).  

Current dog science shows us that, like all animals, dogs will repeat behaviors that get them what they want, and stop doing things that have bad consequences. This is the theory that underpins all dog training, not just R+; if we want a dog to come, we can teach it that coming means a treat, or we can teach it that coming means avoiding a shock.  Both play on the dog�s basic motivation to promote its own wellbeing.  Stephen Darwall explains respect in humans as one person recognizing the other as a legitimate source of authority.  When we talk in terms of morality, we are talking about what kinds of demands we have the authority to make of one another, and how we can ensure that these demands are respected.  Respecting authority, as opposed to deferring to power, comes from recognizing it as legitimate.  Like the ability to comprehend guilt, respect would require the kind of abstract, moral thinking that dogs aren�t capable of. Dogs can understand power and control of resources, however, but this is a long way from the way trainers of both kinds use the principles of behaviorism to build obedience.

In short, the kind of respect that makes the P+ trainer think her relationship is more valuable doesn't exist in dogs.  The only way to characterize a dog's motivation to perform specific "obedience" behaviors is to view it as part of a transactional relationship.  This doesn't mean that your dog doesn't love you or that the relationship between dogs and humans has this quality alone - obedience is just one facet of life with a dog.  It does mean that appeals to human concepts like respect in obedience isn't right.  

If dogs can�t be motivated by respect, then there is the question of what is behind their willingness to obey the P+ trainer.  The answer to that, I believe, is fear of punishment.  

Humans can�t easily differentiate between respect and fear 

We often have a hard time working out exactly what motivates us to do things; sometimes it can come as a shock to realize that we�ve been acting out of jealousy, or the desire for validation.  Even if we work to develop our faculties of empathy and introspection, we can still never be completely sure that we understand the motives of others.  Respect and fear are one such complex.  A child who talks politely to his father because he�s afraid of him might look the same to a stranger as a child who talks that way just because he respects his father.  Similarly, we might see an obedient dog and assume that this evinces respect, but it could simply be fear of punishment.  So, even if dogs could understand respect, we humans are not guaranteed to be able to distinguish it from fear.  

In fact there have been studies that link increased levels of cortisol, the hormone associated with stress and fear, to dogs that have been trained with shock collars (Defra AW1402a).  When the collar was put on the dogs, they began to show higher levels of cortisol, which suggests that they knew something bad was going to happen.  Can we really say with any confidence that dogs trained to avoid shocks are doing so out of respect and not fear?  

The underlying motivation for the P+ trainer�s criticism has been dealt with at this point.  Although the P+ trainer was right to say that respect in humans is a more valuable basis for relationships than being paid is, this doesn�t apply to our dealings with dogs because dogs don�t work that way. 

One consequence of seeing dogs as motivated by their own wellbeing and not by the idea of respect is, how do we work in the idea that dogs understand their relationships to the other animals in their life in terms of a pack hierarchy?  The claim that dog owners have to make themselves their dog�s pack leader only really makes sense if we see the dog as necessarily able to respect the pack leader�s position in itself.  If �pack leader� just means �person to be most afraid of�, then the terminology doesn�t add much to training at all; just ask the owner to use P+ to motivate the dog to be afraid of punishment, which will result in obedience.  Where then the popular belief that dogs automatically respect their social betters?  I�ll be answering this question in my next post.  

References and Notes:

Defra AW1402 (2013) Studies to assess the effect of pet training aids, specifically remote static pulse systems, on the welfare of domestic dogs. University of Lincoln / University of Bristol / Food and Environment Research Agency.  Final report prepared by Prof. Jonathan Cooper, Dr. Hannah Wright, Prof. Daniel Mills (University of Lincoln); Dr. Rachel Casey, Dr. Emily Blackwell (University of Bristol); Katja van Driel (Food and Environment Research Agency); Dr. Jeff Lines (Silsoe Livestock System). 

Defra AW1402a (2013) Studies to assess the effect of pet training aids, specifically remote static pulse systems, on the welfare of domestic dogs; field study of dogs in training. Final report prepared by Prof. Jonathan Cooper, Dr. Nina Cracknell, Jessica Hardiman and Prof. Daniel Mills (University of Lincoln).

Darwall, S. (2006) The Second-Person Standpoint. MA:Harvard University Press.

Horowitz, A. (2009) Disambiguating the �guilty look�: Salient prompts to a familiar dog behavior. Behavioral Processes 81:3, pp. 447-452

This post has been concerned only with the ethical issues underlying P+ trainers� criticism of R+ training.  For a demonstration of the practical misconceptions of my P+ trainer�s viewpoint, see the videos on this list: http://www.auf-den-hund-gekommen.net/-/Proof_Positive.html

For an introduction to the difference between positive and negative reinforcement (taken from a website about human behavior), see: http://bcotb.com/the-difference-between-positivenegative-reinforcement-and-positivenegative-punishment/

The Green Mile

Located near the regional center of Rivne, Ukraine, is a small town called Klevan. As of 2001, its population was 7,470. One of Klevan�s main attractions is an overgrown section of railway that visitors can walk across known as the Tunnel of Love or Green Mile Tunnel.
According to Atlas Obscura, the railroad track is approximately 7km from the city center and stretches about 3km (1.86 miles). The private railway is used to transport wood to a nearby fibreboard factory so a train does run on these tracks up to three times daily. As you can imagine, the tracks are highly photogenic year-round.